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IntroductIon: the art 
of the eye
Preaching is – among others – about perceiving; it is about saying something after having seen something; 
it is about voicing a vision. Numerous homileticians have 
pointed out this link between preaching and perception. 
My Swiss mentor and Doktorvater, Rudolf Bohren, never 
tired of saying that preachers should not only be all ears, 
especially not only all mouths, but rather all eyes.2 My 
South African mentor and Doktorvater, Bethel Müller, 
also taught me that, as preachers, we must continue 
viewing life through the looking glass of the biblical text 
–a homiletical version of Alice in Wonderland,as it were.3
Homiletics without optics is unthinkable: To preach is 
to see – and to invite others to see.4 It calls for a change 
of perception; a rebirth of the senses, and, in particular, 
a conversion of the eyes.5 In this sense, it is analogous 
to faith, which is to see the Invisible, or, in the words 
of Martin Luther, to see that which you do not see and 
not to see that which you do see.6 Faith – preaching – is 
to look deeper and to see further; to obtain in-sight; to 
have vision.
Preaching is about the formation (and the re-
formation) or shifting of perspective.7 David Buttrick, 
in his massive work Homiletic, draws heavily on the 
centrality of perception and perspective in preaching, 
using the metaphors of the lens of the camera and the 
frames in a movie.8 For him, preaching entails the art to 
perceive meticulously that which is in a particular frame, 
but also to move on to the next frame in an aesthetic and 
timely manner. Preaching does not imply the freezing of 
frames, but rather the flow of vision; not a declaration of 
eternal ‘standpoints’, but directions along a route.9
One could say the art of preaching is about the 
discern ment of ‘signs of transcendence’ or epiphanies of 
a deeper dimension, even in the small things of life.10 
Nobody articulates this better than Paivio, speaking on 
behalf of all observers: “But please, let me have plenty 
of detail. That’s what counts in our business, tiny little 
details, like you had a broken shoelace on your left shoe, 
or a fly settled on the rim of your glass at lunch, or the 
man you were talking to had a broken front tooth.”11 
Our own poet Sheila Cussons once put it as follows: 
“Whether it is something sublime or a puddle of milk on 
the table, to you, it may be an image of something much 
more complicated.”12
The Reformer John Calvin often spoke about the 
knowledge of faith as a way of perceiving. For him, 
knowledge entailed more than just superficially taking 
note of the state of affairs around you, but was rather 
an attentive perception of life (he used the French word 
l’entendement).13 In this regard, Calvin, in imitation of 
the Apostle Paul,14 was fond of using the metaphor of a 
mirror.15 To Calvin, this suggested a perception of God, 
albeit indirect and vague, that would otherwise have 
remained unknown – a perception that, like a mirror in 
direct sunlight, would often shock, captivate attention 
and create fascination.16
From a homiletical perspective, one could say that 
the preacher holds up a mirror, reminding us that God 
can in fact be perceived in this world, though in indirect 
and often shocking ways – even if it is through the 
reflections of a murky mirror.17 Standing on the thres-
hold between God’s new creation and the old age of the 
world, preachers help us perceive the former within the 
latter. Charles Campbell, the highly regarded American 
homiletician, speaks about a “bifocal vision” that not 
only perceives the powers of the old age, but especially 
also the signs of the new amidst the old.18
On the one hand, preachers hold up a mirror that 
honestly and relentlessly unmasks the old age – an activity 
that obviously does not endear them to everyone. 
However, the preacher’s task does not conclude here, 
or else this perspective on life would have been a fairly 
tragic one. So, on the other hand, the preacher also holds 
up a mirror that reflects an alternative reality, namely 
God’s new creation, in ways that often reverse our 
‘normal’ perceptions, like mirrors do. Preachers, murky 
mirrors in hand, thus sharpen our bifocal vision,which 
enables us to perceive the light of the in-breaking new 
creation amidst the darkness of the old.19
It is important to understand that our perspectives 
on God, and therefore on life as well, can easily become 
restricted and restrained. We are often blinded, or, at 
least, we become short-sighted. Our God images need 
to be constantly re-visited in order to be re-visioned. 
This is true not only on an individual level, but also in 
terms of our tendency towards shared blind ness and 
group myopia. A painful reminder of this would be the 
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6ideology of apartheid, which, for instance, excelled in 
structured short-sightedness, if not structured blindness 
– and the organised and structured remorselessness 
consequently suffered by some sectors of the church.20 
Everything was seen in black and white.21
Preaching can play an important role in adding colour 
to our perspective; in opening up vistas never seen 
before; in painting rainbows before our eyes. This art of 
the eye, or re-visioning of reality, could also be called the 
reframing of perspective. Reframing is about revisiting 
the existing – the old and the past – as articulated in the 
prefix ‘re-’. However, seen through a theological lens, 
reframing comprises much more than mere repetition 
(repetitio) of, for instance, ecclesial tradition or a mere 
imitation (imitatio) of biblical truths; rather, it refers to 
change that in fact creates new ‘realities’. It is both re 
and creatio at the same time – in the strongest sense of 
both concepts.22 It is real change, but of the existing.
The theory of reframing was originally developed within 
the context of a philosophically based theory of change, 
which was consequently adapted by psychologists and 
neurological-change theorists.23 One of the objectives of 
reframing was to “create new alternative behaviors”.24 
Reframing changes meaning, and changed meaning results 
in behavioural change.25 Donald Capps, who introduced 
the concept of reframing to theological thought, speaks 
about the difference between a first-order and a second-
order change, and maintains that the former occurs 
within a given system (although the system as such 
remains unchanged), while the latter transforms the 
system itself.26 First-order change is “more of the same”, 
and offers solutions that, in themselves, become or, at 
least, add to the problem.27 It indeed entails repetition of 
what is known within a system; perhaps even impressive 
or sensational repetition, but still merely repetition.28
Second-order change, on the contrary, refers to 
funda mental transformation, although it does not nor-
mally occur spontaneously, because the frame in which 
we live is strongly woven. This frame does not change 
easily and can keep you prisoner. As a matter of fact, 
it is almost impossible to break free from it.29 For this 
change of perspective, or change of frame, to take place, 
one needs the art of reframing, namely “to change the 
conceptual and/or emotional setting or viewpoint in re-
lation to which a situation is experienced and to place it 
in another frame which fits the ‘facts’ of the same con-
crete situation equally well or even better, and thereby 
changes its entire meaning”.30 According to my under-
standing of the concept, this implies a theological recon-
figuration of the existing in such a way that something 
distinctly new is born, but never without the existing. 
It entails, among others, the art of doing and saying the 
same things in (sometimes completely) different ways; 
of using the existing to say and do the new by means of 
juxta position.31
The frame – or paradigm – through which reality is 
viewed is indeed of the utmost importance. We could 
even assume that this frame mediates meaning (or the 
viewer’s understanding thereof). It could therefore also 
reveal the theology (or lack thereof) that lies behind a 
church and preacher’s ways of perceiving. The frame 
both evokes and replicates the structure of the theology 
that has given birth to it, and, in the process, also reveals 
the basic anthropology underlying it. In a nutshell: The 
frame through and within which we observe reality both 
reveals and forms our images of God and humanity. 
Preaching has everything to do with this framing, and 
reframing, of our perspectives. 
reframIng wIthIn the 
PersPectIves of foolIshness 
and wIsdom
there are of course many images of, and perspectives on, God. God has many faces.32 I am convinced that 
the presupposition on which all of these multifaceted 
images and perspectives are based can be traced back 
to the notion of paradox, i.e. God’s presence in this 
world and his sub contrario revelations (revelation in 
contradictions). In the words of Hendrikus Berkhof: 
“He can be present in his world only as a stranger, 
the suffering servant, the crucified one. The concept 
of paradox is suitable here: God is present contrary to 
(para) the appearance (doxa) of the opposite.”33 This 
point of departure is crucial for the basic structure of 
preaching, and, in my opinion, forms the leitmotiv of all 
preaching that intends to reframe perspective. 
We often, if not always, find God’s presence in this 
world – the ‘signs of transcendence’ and epiphanies 
of a deeper dimension, even in the small things of 
life – surprising and even shocking: It contradicts our 
understandings and images of who God is or should 
be.34 Even from the beginning, the message of the gospel 
contradicted our expectations. In fact, many thought – 
and still do – that such a strange gospel, in which the 
defencelessness of the cross instead of a conventional, 
powerful God is central, could indeed be described as 
absurd and ludicrous, and become a stumbling block and 
irritation to many as a result.35
Many homileticians have traced the roots of Paul’s 
description of the foolishness of preaching back to his 
7letters to the Corinthians, for example when he states: 
“For the message of the cross is foolishness to those 
who are perishing, but to us who are being saved it is the 
power of God… For since, in the wisdom of God, the 
world did not know God through wisdom, God decided, 
through the foolishness of our proclamation, to save those 
who believe.”36 Later on, Paul says in the same vein: 
“I think that God has exhibited us apostles as last of all, 
as though sentenced to death, because we have become 
a spectacle to the world, to angels and to mortals. We 
have become fools for the sake of Christ…”37
With pronouncements like these, Paul in fact de-
constructs (reframes) some basic notions of his time, 
especially in terms of (God’s) power and wisdom. While 
the Jews were looking for signs – which, in their tradition, 
often meant a direct and clear revelation of God, or the 
actions of powerful people who could perform wonders 
and conjure up signs – the Greeks were yearning for 
wisdom, i.e. the power to discern and lead the way 
without wavering. Greek wisdom stemmed from the 
philosophical and theoretical reflection on the origin and 
destination of humanity. It entailed the ability to explain 
the visible and invisible influences on life, history and 
society. Wisdom was understood as a form of power; 
knowledge, in a sense, equalled power.38
The cross, on the other hand, is about a strange form of 
powerlessness, which both Jews and Greeks would have 
deemed foolishness. This is the real scandal (skandalon) 
of the cross: Christ, the Crucified, is the radically ‘weak’ 
One, and, consequently, those who follow him must and 
will necessarily be weak – at least in the eyes of those 
who seek power and wisdom.39 Such an idea could not 
be entertained by the theological, philosophical, political 
or cultural imagination of Paul’s time. It was a shocking, 
blasphemous paradox.40 In short, it was foolishness. In 
fact, according to some exegetists, the translated term 
‘foolishness’ is still too mild. Instead, it was “madness”.41 
Some have even called the madness of the cross a 
crude and vulgar joke; a macabre expression of “gallows 
humor”.42 Others refer to it as a “parodic exaltation” – 
indeed, the cross “was designed to mimic, parody, and 
puncture the pretensions of insubordinate transgressors 
by displaying a deliberately horrible mirror of their self-
elevation”.43
The foolishness of the cross does not mean that it 
is unintelligible, or that it requires or presupposes the 
sacrificing of intellectual reflection (sacrificium intellectus). 
It is rather a different, inverted and reframed form of 
power and wisdom. The foolishness of God (to mōron 
tou theou) indicates the way in which God is revealed 
in Christ – as powerless. That is why Paul often speaks 
about Christ’s followers in terms of paradoxes: ‘We 
should become foolish, in order to become wise, and 
when we are weak, we are strong.’44 Indeed, these are 
the hallmarks of the preacher as fool; as moron for 
Christ: foolishness and powerlessness – which really 
point to wisdom and power of a different, paradoxical 
order.45
This radical deconstruction and reframing of power 
and wisdom have fundamental implications on a variety 
of levels. Of specific importance to us is the impact 
on preaching. Preaching presupposes (and mediates) 
certain God images. However, preaching is hardly com-
prehendible without its connection to the church, and 
the church, in turn, should not be thought of as standing 
separate from society. Here, the presupposition is that 
preaching, being an activity embedded in the church, 
could have a transformative impact on society in 
the sense that it contributes to the construction, or 
deconstruction, of certain God images. Unfortunately, 
though, it could also lead to certain fixed God images, as 
in the apartheid era.
The radical deconstruction and reframing advocated 
by Paul have fundamental theological, homiletical, eccle-
siological and societal consequences – especially as far as 
our notion of ‘power’ is concerned. Preaching, being the 
foolishness of inverted power, could indeed be instrumental 
for a church wishing to deconstruct and reframe existing 
God images so as to convey new meaning within a 
society that finds itself in transit – a society that often 
misunderstands and misappropriates power.46
reframIng: vIsItIng a (seemIngly 
unlIkely) collaborator
not unlike preaching, art too is about perceiving; art too conveys something – albeit in a unique 
manner – after having seen something; it too voices a 
vision. If it is good, art too, perhaps even primarily, is 
about reframing. It offers new insights into reality; a new 
take on things. Often, art challenges our conventional 
perspectives, and shocks the status quo of our individual 
or societal blindness. It invokes us to look again or to 
change our viewpoint (the coordinates from which we 
perceive). It questions the validity of the mirrors that we 
use to view life.
Therefore, ‘reframing’ is not alien to the world of 
art. Perhaps, reframing could even be called a ‘gentle’ 
or unobtrusive art rather than a science – although it is 
obviously not unscientific in nature.47 As a matter of fact, 
one could say that reframing is principally an aesthetic 
concept: It is no coincidence that artworks are normally 
8framed, and, as we shall point out, indeed sometimes 
also bring about reframing. In any case, (good) art always 
seems to reframe life, or certain dimensions thereof.48
We now turn to three examples of aesthetic re-
framing. The concept of reframing is open to a rich 
variety of interpretations – therefore, the following may 
only serve to whet the appetite. It is important to note 
that even though these examples represent different 
nuances of reframing, they also overlap in the sense 
that they transform the objects that they are dealing 
with, without completely discarding them. It remains re-
creatio; existing material that is ‘reframed’. Here follows 
the first example:
reframing as renaming 
Here, Marcel Duchamp’s (in)famous artwork entitled 
Fountain (1917) could serve as an example.49 The work 
simply consists of a porcelain urinal taken out of its 
customary setting and placed in a new and unfamiliar 
one, namely an art gallery. Duchamp submitted Fountain 
under the pseudonym “R. Mutt” as a type of prank, but 
also as a critique on some of the most basic conventions 
of (avant-garde) art. The organisers of the exhibition 
were furious: Was the artist equating modern art with 
a toilet? Fountain was promptly removed from the 
exhibition, and mysteriously ‘disappeared’ thereafter. It 
was simply too scandalous for the art establishment of 
the time.
With this artwork, Duchamp introduced the 
concept of the ‘ready-made’ or ‘found object’ to the 
art world, and, in so doing, challenged the traditional 
preconceptions of what art is or should be in typical 
Dadaistic fashion.50 It is important to note that Duchamp 
did not alter the form of the art object besides adding a 
date and fictitious name on the side and, significantly, 
turning the object upside down – like the reflection of 
certain mirrors would do. However, he took it out of its 
customary setting (or frame), placed it within a new one, 
and, again quite meaningfully, renamed it. The urinal now 
becomes a fountain. Through this act of reframing, which 
includes renaming, the object is given a new identity. It 
becomes a new ‘reality’.
Duchamp defended the artwork against charges that 
it was mere plagiarism or a plain piece of plumbing. 
According to him, the question was not whether “Mr 
Mutt” had created the fountain with his own hands or 
not; what was important was that he had in fact chosen 
this object; that he had taken it as an ordinary article 
of life and placed it so that its normal significance 
disappeared under the new title and viewpoint, and thus 
gave it new meaning.
This artwork exemplifies that nothing is ‘real’ in itself, 
and that everything could at best be described as adioforon 
(something without value as such, until evaluated – 
admittedly within and therefore bound to the evaluator’s 
own psychological, cultural and social frameworks). This 
is what Dadaism inter alia tried to achieve: to challenge 
the art world with its set beliefs about (the depiction 
of) reality.51 Dadaism protested against the snobbery 
and traditionalism of the art establishment, and warned 
against a narcotic stupor within aesthetics. As such, it 
represented a type of anti-art, for the sake of art.52
Duchamp’s artwork illustrates the fact that renaming 
can in fact create (new) reality. In this case, a urinal is 
given a new name, and ‘becomes’ a fountain! Could one 
venture to say that it might have affected the way in 
which viewers thereafter looked at and evaluated both 
urinals and fountains?
One of the ways in which reframing could take place 
through renaming is of course by means of language 
– a mode of reframing that is obviously important for 
preaching. Preaching is about voicing a vision, but also the 
creation of a vision through a voice (and words). Not 
only does the vision create the words; the words also 
create the vision. Therefore, preaching is not only to say 
something after having seen something (Someone); it is 
also about seeing something after having said something. 
As a matter of fact, preaching is about the interplay of eyes 
and ears, if not all the senses.53
But, one may ask, where do we find such visionary 
and (en)visioning words for preaching? As already 
indicated, preaching is inter alia about discerning signs 
9of transcendence in everyday life. This means, on the 
one hand, that the preacher should be sensitive for, and 
observant of, life. Preachers should be able to discern 
the religious dimensions of people’s experiences in space 
and time.54 Experiences, those of a religious nature too, 
occur in space and time. However, the space and time 
within which these experiences take place are always 
particular spaces and particular times.55 This means 
that preachers will have to linger, and even dwell, in 
the spaces and times of those to whom they intend to 
preach if they are to connect to these people’s particular 
(religious) experiences. 
In the imagery of Duchamp and the Dadaists: 
Preachers will continuously have to take account of 
everyday ‘ready-made’ or ‘found objects’; they will have 
to keep on re-visiting life. It does not end here, though: 
Preachers are called to discern precisely these everyday 
experiences as religious experiences, and to interpret 
them as such to those who listen to their preaching. 
The preacher’s task is inter alia to reframe such 
experiences so as to enable people to recognise these 
seemingly mundane experiences as experiences packed 
with profound meaning. Experiences must be renamed, 
for which purpose the preacher needs the language of 
experience.56 An important way to rename experiences 
is to share your own experiences with others – this also 
prevent spreachers from speaking in an abstract, foreign 
manner. Instead, preachers are inter alia called to 
continue to seek words that describe experiences that 
describe life. In fact, this is an inevitable and continuous 
homiletic process: both finding and creating appropriate 
language of experience. In short: Language of experience 
may serve as tool for the reframing of perspective.57
Still, however, the preacher’s task does not end here. 
Theologically speaking, preaching is more than merely 
connecting to or even clarifying experiences. The focus 
on the hearer – whom Bohren calls “homiletics’ beloved 
child, being born out of a massive adaptation to society” 
– may not become exclusive.58 Experiences could also 
be wrong, even destructive. Therefore, they need to 
be interpreted, but, often, also directed and, indeed, 
transformed. In Duchamp’s imagery: The picture must 
be turned upside down and renamed.
For this, the preacher needs a specific perspective; a 
particular frame, lens or mirror within and through which 
life can be viewed, namely that of Scripture. Looking 
at life’s experiences through this lens, alternatives 
become discernible: That which we have deemed to 
be wise could in fact be foolish, and vice versa. That 
which has been invisible to the human eye comes into 
focus through this lens. Through this lens, we learn “to 
picture, portray, receive and practice the world in ways 
other than it appears to be at first glance when seen 
through a dominant, habitual, unexamined lens”.59
It is not by chance that John Calvin called this lens 
through which we must look the spectacles of Scripture.60 
Regarding Calvin’s vision on (and through) Scripture, 
Garret Green writes as follows: “… [T]he scriptures are 
not something we look at but rather look through, lenses 
that refocus what we see into an intelligible pattern.” 
61He goes on: “[I]ts images permit us to see a dimension 
of depth in the world that is not otherwise apparent.”62
Through the spectacles of Scripture, reality is 
reframed and renamed. There are many instances of 
renaming in the Bible itself. It starts out with the Genesis 
narrative, where creation (sun, moon, stars) is named 
and, in this way, renamed as God’s (and not the gods’) 
property. In so doing, reality is ‘created’ as God’s reality. 
Even human beings receive the gift of (re)naming the 
animals, thereby ‘creating’ reality within the cosmos.63 
Ultimately, we too are renamed through the Christ 
event: We are now called Christians.64 One could say 
our lives have been turned upside down through the 
reframing and renaming of our identity.
Preaching that similarly renames reality as reality coram 
deo could indeed be called Namenrede,65 as Bohren also 
argued. Namenrede entails speaking about the Name(s) 
of God, or rather speaking out (i.e. discerning) the multi-
coloured presences of God within all the realms of our 
realities – from the broken shoelace on your left shoe to 
the puddle of milk on the table. 
This brings us to the second example of aesthetic 
reframing.
reframing as re-configuration
Sometimes, the way in which reframing turns worlds 
upside down must take on a more radical, perhaps even 
offensive and disruptive form.66 Sometimes, the frame 
within which we are fixed is so firmly cast in concrete 
that drastic measures for re-configuration are needed. 
Therefore, when we speak about re-visiting reality 
(‘reality as is’; ‘ready-made’), we must hasten to underline 
once more: This does not mean simply ‘more of the 
same’ or a romanticised re-visiting or re-membering 
of the past. Reframing is not equal to mere repetition 
or re-gurgitation. On the contrary, reframing implies 
dynamic processes such as re-naming (‘re-labelling’), 
re-visioning, re-aligning and re-imagining.67 I nstead of 
‘more of the same’, reframing entails alternatives, even 
paradoxes, that challenge the existing to attain new 
meaning, thereby evoking behavioural change.68
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Reframing is not a harmless event. It can in fact be 
quite disruptive and disturbing. No-one understands this 
better than the award-winning, internationally known 
South African cartoonist Zapiro. He calls his specific 
reframing genre “offensive cartooning”.69
Zapiro has been challenging the political (and other) 
powers that be in South Africa for many years, and has 
played an important and unique role in revealing the true 
face of apartheid through his often shocking cartoons.70 
Ironically, President Jacob Zuma sued Zapiro in the 
post-apartheid era for cartoons that had criticised 
him (Zuma).71 In one of his cartoons, Zapiro uses the 
metaphor of circled wagons to depict a response to a 
perceived threat. This must be seen against the backdrop 
of criticism levelled at the governing party of South Africa, 
the African National Congress (ANC), for allegedly 
having committed corruption in the now-infamous 
arms deal with German and British companies. At that 
stage, the ANC had rallied together in rejecting all those 
allegations and resisting a call for an independent judicial 
inquiry.72 With the following cartoon, Zapiro parodies 
the government’s ‘circling of the wagons’ in response to 
the accusations surrounding the arms scandal.73
In his cartoon, Zapiro compares the ANC government’s 
actions to those of the Voortrekkers at Blood River. 
Now, though, the circle is not formed by wagons but by 
cars.74 The stinging irony of the cartoon is inescapable: 
Zapiro suggests that the very same liberation movement 
that fought against all that the Voortrekkers’ circled 
wagons represented is repeating history now that they 
occupy the seats of power. It is hard to imagine a more 
incisive critique. In fact, Zapiro duplicates the basic struc-
ture of the original, but does so in a manner that radically 
re configures it at the same time.
This is reframing at its best! 
From a homiletical perspective, it is important to 
understand that the Bible is also filled with language and 
images that reframe reality – often also in disturbing and 
disruptive ways. Biblical texts serve as lenses, mirrors 
and spectacles that offer perspectives on God’s many 
faces and acts – perspectives, however, that do not 
always tie in with our views and expectations of who 
God is or should be. The Bible is not a harmless book 
that neatly serves the domestication of society; instead, 
it is a book that leads to the fundamental reframing of 
our perspectives. This often follows a specific pattern.
Firstly, there is a moment of orientation, when you 
recognise something familiar, something ‘ready-made’, in 
the image. This is followed by the phase of disorientation 
(not necessarily sequentially; mostly simultaneously), 
when the image questions your notion of reality, thereby 
disrupting and overturning it. This is the way in which 
many biblical images and language structures work: For 
instance, a familiar metaphor suddenly becomes strange 
and challenging, all of a sudden subverting the status quo 
– like a small piece of yeast emerging as an inexorable 
kingdom.75 Indeed, Scriptural images often are counter-
images; images that give us such an ‘imaginative shock’ 
that it presents to us the dissimilar yet liberating ‘like’ of 
the kingdom.76
This shock is indeed liberating, for, after the dis-
orientation, a phase of re-orientation normally follows. 
Now, the image opens up new possibilities and worlds 
for us; it functions as a world-creating power. Many of 
the language structures of the Bible reveal this pattern, 
for instance through the use of parody, paradox, irony, 
metaphor, indirect speech, ridicule, and so forth – all 
forms of language that somehow turn our realities 
upsidedown and dance on the head of so-called logic.77 
Biblical texts often serve as counter-testimonies to, or 
cross-examinations of, our ‘non-negotiable’ core beliefs. 
Often, they reveal sides or images of God that hardly 
fit in with our conventional theological and homiletical 
language. The art of preaching as reframing does not only 
include speaking the language of everyday experience, 
but also articulating this strange language of the Bible 
as verbum alienum. In fact, the dialogue or interaction 
between these two forms of discourse is what could be 
called preaching.
As already suggested, however, this language of 
preaching does not attempt to disrupt and disturb for 
the sake of disruption and disturbance only. It rather 
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aims to bring about re-orientation. Such re-orientation 
is brought about by re-imagination, which constitutes 
the third example of aesthetic reframing.
reframing as re-imagination
Preaching has been called the art of re-imagination.78 
Reframing includes re-imagination. An exceptionally 
striking example of this – as a matter of fact, one of 
the most classic forms of reframing – is to be found in 
the era of the Reformation. It could indeed be said that 
the Reformation was not only about the rediscovery of 
the Word of the gospel, but also of the importance of 
imagination, and re-imagination.79
Martin Luther along with others probably helped 
to create the atmosphere (or was it the other way 
around?) for a number of Northern German artists to 
create momentous works during the transition between 
the Gothic and Renaissance eras – for example Lucas 
Cranach, Albrecht Dürer, and, particularly, Matthias 
Grünewald (1470–1528), who left us one of the most 
moving works from the Reformist era. His famous 
depiction of Christ’s crucifixion,80 completed two years 
after Luther nailed his statements to the church door 
in Wittenberg, represents a dramatic paradigm shift in 
which Christ is no longer surrounded by a sentimental 
halo; his suffering is no longer aesthetically softened – 
on the contrary. Here, we no longer see the athletic 
and heroic Christ of the Renaissance, but rather a 
body that symbolises the most extreme disfiguration 
and degradation possible of one human being by other 
human beings. The entire image has been re-imagined – 
away from a scene of serenity towards the crude reality 
of the cross.
In this depiction, the crown of thorns and Christ’s hair 
are intertwined, interlaced – because, in this moment, 
Christ is His suffering. Broken, mutilated, Godforsaken 
He hangs there. His arms have been stretched out of 
proportion. His hands are distorted, as if in a physical 
cry that simultaneously seems (sounds) like a desperate 
lament before, but also a complete surrender to, God. 
His feet have been battered out of shape, depicting the 
Gothic view on suffering and mortality in all its extremity.
The Crucified’s lips are purple, like those of one who 
has suffocated. The macabre body tilts forward, under 
the heavy burden of sin, to such an extent that even 
the wooden cross buckles. His body is blue-grey and 
swollen, showing the grisly details of the lashing and 
suffering on the cross. The deep background colours are 
sharply contrasted with the figures in the foreground – 
a characteristic use of light and darkness, a technique 
known as chiaroscuro.81
To the left, on her knees, Mary Magdalene wrings her 
hands together in prayer. Next to her is a jar of fragrant 
oil. Mary, Mother of Jesus, recoils from the gruesome 
body and the horror of death, supported by the disciple 
John – another significant re-imagining away from the 
traditional tranquillity of a Mother of God scene. On 
the right, John the Baptist, with a significantly large 
forefinger, proclaims: There is the Lamb of God who 
takes away the sin of the world. In front is a lamb with a 
cross and a chalice at its feet – a symbol of the victory of 
this Lamb; paradox of all paradoxes.
What makes this classic work even more impressive 
is that it was painted to hang in a convent hospital in 
Isenheim – a hospital that specialised in skin diseases 
such as asergotism.82 In this context, the details 
on the skin of the Crucified would have offered 
an inescapable point of identification and, thus, 
comfort.83 Through this strange, anti-aestheticised 
aesthetic, the gospel is mediated.84 Indeed – 
paradox of all paradoxes!
It is a well-known fact that, for more than 50 
years, this painting of Grünewald hung above the 
desk of none other than Karl Barth, who made 
more than 50 references to it in several of his 
primary writings. He even called it a “visual aid” 
to his life’s work.85 As for the Baptist’s prominent 
index finger, Barth says: “Could anyone point 
away from himself more impressively and 
completely?”86 This depiction indeed expresses 
what Stanley Hauerwas called “looking in the 
right direction”!87
This masterpiece represents a form of re-
imagination of the gospel – against the sentimen-
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talist tide of the time – that has since re-created mean-
ing and re-stimulated behavioural change for many who 
had seen it. As such, it also illustrates the core task of 
preaching, namely the continuous re-imagination of the gos-
pel against domesticated images of Christ.
conclusIon
although preaching as reframing can sometimes be disruptive and disturbing, even weird, unexpected 
and paradoxical, it remains a ‘gentle’, unobtrusive 
art. Reframing does not intend bringing about change 
as a type of ‘hostile take-over’ by means of force or 
manipulation. Normally, homiletical reframing does not 
force the ‘signs’ of God’s immanence upon people. After 
all, God’s footsteps (vestigia dei) in this world are not 
the thunderous stomping of a giant. On the contrary, 
God’s footsteps are easily overlooked and not heard. 
Homiletical reframing helps us to hear these footsteps 
and see these signs, and point towards God’s (fragile, 
crucified) presence in the frames of our realities – like 
John the Baptist’s index finger.88
Obviously, this type of preaching is a serious matter 
that often stems from as well as evokes lament. However, 
lament and laughter are two sides of the same coin; both 
form part of the ‘foolishness’ of preaching that turns 
wisdom upside down.89 Likewise, reframing, being “the 
very lifeblood of wise-fool ministry”, is often playful and 
humorous, accompanied by liberating laughter.90 It calls 
for the humour of hope. In the words of Donald Capps: 
“Lightness of touch and the releasing power of laughter 
are essential to the art of reframing. Otherwise, the 
art degenerates into a weapon which manipulates and 
mocks the very ones it means to help, and dehumanizes 
those who use it. Reframing is not for angry prophets, 
but for prophets who know the releasing power of 
laughter. Reframing is for prophets who are wise enough 
to know that God can get along perfectly well without 
them, and fool enough to believe that God would never 
try to go it alone.”91
Preaching as reframing perceives and renames; it 
disrupts and disturbs. However, it also points towards 
new realities and new possibilities. It constantly 
challenges our fixed images of God; it reminds us that 
our experiences of God, our theologies and preaching 
on God, are but the beginning, and that our deepest 
dogmas and finest formulations are but stuttering on the 
profoundest mystery that is God. It aids us in looking 
in and through the reframing mirror – the looking 
glass – of the biblical text, knowing full well that God’s 
revelation is simultaneously God’s concealment, and 
God’s concealment simultaneously God’s revelation.92 It 
reminds us that our frames are not structures of steel, 
but penlines and brushstrokes.
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1  The artwork on the front cover is one of his own 
works entitled Interior of the Cross: Introspective 
Reflection (2009). It is on display in the foyer of the 
chapel of the Faculty of Theology, Stellenbosch 
University. The artwork consists of a wooden box 
with a painted window at the back, revealing a tranquil 
African scene, as well as a real window at the front, 
inviting the viewer to look into the interior. Light falling 
through the window at the back is painted on the 
floor of the interior. At the same time, though, natural 
light falls through the front window into the interior, 
creating subtle shadows of a cross. This is due to the 
crossbars of the front window, but also depends on the 
position of the viewer standing in front of the artwork. 
Therefore, the viewer sees the ‘interior of the cross’ 
from two sides, as it were: the painted window at the 
back as well as the front window. At first glance, the 
window frames seem to be just that – ordinary window 
frames. Yet, closer scrutiny reveals that they have been 
taken out of their ordinary setting, without the form 
having been altered dramatically. Rather, subtle ‘clues’ or 
‘signs’ are introduced that ‘reframe’ the window frames 
to acquire new identity and meaning – the shadow of a 
crucified figure on the inside (hanging from the ‘cross’ 
of the window as part of the shadow falling on the 
floor), as well as the curtain tie-backs made of thorn 
branches. Something quite ‘ordinary’ is reframed in 
terms of the Christ event. Life – including the suffering 
of life as embodied in the crucifixion – is now viewed 
in the light of the resurrection – which literally shines 
through both windows! The curtain to the holiest 
inner sanctuary has been pulled away through the 
suffering of Christ (his crown of thorns). These ‘signs’, 
as seen in the light of the crucifixion, re-signify life as 
holy. The ‘interior of the cross’ now glows in the light 
of the resurrection, and life is re-dignified through 
these subtle clues or footsteps of God (vestigiae dei) 
in our reality. The viewer’s vision is challenged; the 
work implores you: ‘Look again, look deeper, look 
anew.’ Life between the front and rear windows (the 
‘interior of the cross’) actually bathes in the light of the 
resurrection, and the viewer is given a new perspective 
through the lens, and in the light, of this radical 
‘reframing-through-resurrection’.
2 According to Bohren, our senses are actually 
connected much more closely than we can ever 
imagine: For instance, we also ‘see’ with our ears, and 
‘hear’ with our eyes. On this interaction of the senses, 
this “engen Verknüpfung von Hören und Sehen”, he 
says: “Was ich höre, stelle ich mir vor, und das heisst 
doch, dass ich auch mit den Augen höre.” [Rudolf 
Bohren, Predigtlehre (München: Kaiser, 1980), 268.]
3  Bethel Müller states: “Naturally, all biblical texts 
are lenses through which we can look at the world, 
especially imaginatively, at the future. After all, the 
imagination is the ability to see, to see better, to see 
further, to see differently, to see the Invisible… Texts 
are adventures (with Alice!) ‘in wonderland’… A 
hermeneutic of amazement is a hermeneutic that looks 
into, and then through, the multidimensional lenses of 
the text, thereby opening creative new interpretations 
of the text.” [Bethel Müller, “Liturgical and homiletical 
revisioning to generate hope for a just society”, Divine 
Justice – Human Justice, eds J.S. Dreyer& J.A. van der 
Ven (Pretoria: HSRC, 2002), 209.]
4  Tom Long, the American practical theologian, talks 
about a double vision: looking back through the lens of 
the text, and, through the same lens, looking forward 
towards the congregation, acting as eyewitness to the 
great acts of God. [Thomas G. Long, The Witness of 
Preaching, 2nd ed (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 
2005), 18–51; cf also Johan Cilliers, The Living voice 
of the Gospel. Revisiting the basic principles of preaching 
(Stellenbosch: Sun Press, 2004), 64.]
5 In Rudolf Bohren’s words: “Wir brauchen… eine 
Wende der Wahrnehmung, und diese Wende muss 
eine Wiedergeburt sein.”[Rudolf Bohren, Vom Heiligen 
Geist. 5 Betrachtungen (München: Kaiser, 1981), 73.]
6  In his commentary on Hebrews 11:27, Luther states: 
“Haec enim est fidei natura… videre, quod non videt, 
et non videre quod videt.” [Martin Luther, Weimarer 
Ausgabe (WA) (Weimar: Hermann Böhlau, 1883), 57/3, 
188.]
7  Charles Campbell & Stan Saunders, The Word on the 
Street. Performing the Scriptures in the Urban Context 
(Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 2000), 30.
8  David Buttrick, Homiletic: Moves and Structures 
(Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1987).
9  In regard to liturgy, Stanley Hauerwas says: “In 
worship, we are busy looking in the right direction.” 
[S.Hauerwas & W.H. Willimon, Resident Aliens 
(Nashville Abingdon, 1989), 95.]
10 [Birgit Weyel, “Predigt und Alltagskunst. Wilhelm 
Genazino und der poetische Blick auf das Leben”, 
Religion – Ästhetik – Medien.Band 2. Ästhetik und Religion. 
Interdisziplinäre Beiträge zur Identität und Differenz von 
ästhetischer und religiöser Erfahrung, eds Gräb, W.; 
endnotes
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Hermann, J.; Kulbarsch, L.; Metelmann, J.& Weyel, 
B. (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2007), 209–211; 
Peter Berger, Redeeming Laughter. The Comic Dimension 
of Human Experience (Berlin/New York: Walter de 
Gruyter, 1997), 205.] The concept ‘see’ is of course 
used in a variety of nuances in the Bible, and has also 
been interpreted differently in the course of church 
history. In Scripture, it sometimes takes the form of a 
vision, with a concomitant ecstatic condition, especially 
in the Old-Testament prophets (cf Isa 1; Ezek 12, etc). 
However, in the New Testament too, it always leads to 
a new revelation of the truth (underlined by  
hearing ‘inaudible’ words), and a new awareness of 
God’s presence (cf Ac 9 and 16). The distinction 
between these visions and dreams is fluid, and they 
usually deal with immediate situations (cf Ac 12)  
as well as the prospect of what may still be in the 
distant future yet impending (cf especially Daniel and 
Revelation). Naturally, in the Gospels, it also attains 
the meaning of the disciples’ biological vision of Jesus 
during His earthly performance as well as after His 
resurrection. Many of the stories of His appearance 
report: “I have seen the Lord!” (Jh 20:18). Especially 
John uses the concept ‘see’ deliberately in constructing 
his gospel, and mostly in an ambiguous way: There is 
more to see than what you perceive at first glance; 
more than just bread or water or light, for example. 
Everything has a deeper dimension and meaning. In 
virtually every chapter of his gospel, John demonstrates 
that to look is not always to see. Therefore, the way 
in which you ‘see’ could mean either redemption or 
judgment (cf 9:35–41). This applies especially to the 
way in which you look at Jesus. To all appearances, 
Jesus of Nazareth resembles an ordinary human 
being. But look again! The disciples saw Him with 
their (biological) eyes, and yet saw more. They saw 
His glory; His glory as the Father’s only Son – full of 
grace and truth (1:14; cf also 1 Jh 1:1–4). They saw His 
‘inglorious glory’. Especially in the latter sense, I use 
the concept ‘see’ as ‘seeing-against-the-ostensible’; as 
seeing, although you see a contradiction; as seeing God 
in the paradoxical; as being convinced of the things we 
cannot see (now, with our biological eyes) (Heb 11:1). 
Of course, it is also something other than a mystical  
union with God, as often maintained by mysticism. 
Instead, it deals with God who reveals Himself in a 
unique way, so that we can acquire a new vision of 
our place before God and in our world. This does not 
exclude the experience of faith attested to throughout 
the Bible: the ‘not-seeing’ of God; the wrestling with 
His silence and absence; the sigh: “My God, my God, 
why have You deserted me?” (Ps 22:2; Hab 113; 
Ps 42:2; Mk 15:34, etc). Sometimes, believers also 
go through a desert and winter experience, when 
everything in and around them entirely contradicts the 
good news of Immanuel, of God with us. At such times 
– not only in the lives of individual believers,  
but also in the history of the church or a specific 
church – they experience God to be distant; to have 
forgotten His people, looking the other way (cf Ps 
13:1–3), or even worse, they feel that it was the Lord 
Himself who caused their misery (cf the refrain ‘You 
have … You allow … You disown … Your wrath lies 
upon me…’ in Ps 88, e.g.). Exactly therefore, it is called 
a vision of faith, and is not meant in a superficial or 
simplistic sense.
11 A. Paivio & D. Foth, “Imaginal and verbal mediation and 
noun concreteness in paired-associate learning: The 
illusive interaction”, Journal of verbal learning and verbal 
behavior, 9 (1971):442.
12 Sheila Cussons in an interview with Volksblad, 21 
August 1979.
13  [Gerrit W. Neven, “De Kwintessens van Calvijn”, Het 
calvinistisch ongemak: Calvijn als erflater en provocator 
van het Nederlandse protestantisme, eds Rinse Reeling 
Brouwer, Bert de Leede&KlaasSpronk (Kampen: Kok, 
2009), 80.] The French word l’ entendement could 
also be translated as ‘comprehension’, ‘intelligence’, 
‘discernment’, ‘appreciation’ and ‘judgment’.
14  1 Corinthians 13:12.
15  The metaphor of the mirror was of course well known 
and beloved among the philosophers and authors of 
the time – reminiscent of the way in which Paul uses it 
to suggest the preliminary nature of our knowledge in 
this dispensation (1 Corinthians 13:12). The mirrors of 
antiquity revealed, but also concealed; they could offer 
only a dim reflection of reality.
16  [Neven, “De Kwintessens van Calvijn”, 80,81.] 
According to Calvin, the metaphor of the mirror 
could be linked to certain places, facts, experiences 
and histories that function as mirrors of God, inviting 
us to get a glimpse of God’s acts, albeit indirect and 
incomplete. In other words, for Calvin, the mirror 
represents the palette of earthly media through which 
the multi-coloured knowledge of God can be reflected 
in order to create as well as nourish our faith.  
[Cf also Cornelius van der Kooi, Als in een Spiegel. God 
kennen volgens Calvijn en Barth (Kampen: Kok, 2002), 
22,23.]
17 1 Corinthians 13:12.
15
18 Charles Campbell & Johan Cilliers, Preaching Fools. The 
Gospel as a Rhetoric of Folly (Baylor University Press, 
forthcoming), n.p.
19 Campbell & Cilliers, Preaching Fools, n.p.
20  The frame within which reality (God and humanity) 
was placed and viewed was that of an enclave 
mentality. [Cf. Johan Cilliers & Ian Nell, ‘“Within the 
enclave”: Profiling South African social and religious 
developments since 1994’, Verbum et Ecclesia 32/1 
(2011):1–7.] People were indoctrinated (structurally 
blinded) to see no further than their own (nationalistic, 
cultural, religious and, especially, ethnic) horizons. The 
frame formed by this ideology obstructed any view 
of alternatives – the only view that ‘we’ could have 
of‘them’ was that of ‘us’ against the ‘enemy’. Identity 
(‘we’; ‘us’) was formed based on ethnic categories. 
[Johan Cilliers, God for us? An analysis and evaluation 
of Dutch Reformed preaching during the Apartheid years 
(Stellenbosch: Sun Press, 2006), 63–76.]
21  Writing about ‘black and white’, Mary Douglas states 
the following: “Seeing things in black and white is 
definitely a limitation. When you miss the colour, you 
miss the nuance, the 3D effect is softened, and facial 
expression is less vivid. We know this from black and 
white photography and old black and white cinema. I 
am using this title to talk about certain forms of social 
organisation that promote anger. This limited vision 
divides the world into two kinds: on one side ourselves, 
our fellow members, our friends; and on the other side, 
all the rest, outsiders. In the extreme case, insiders are 
saints and outsiders shunned as sinners. Inside is white; 
outside is black. In extreme cases it makes a world 
of saints and sinners. A wall of virtue keeps the two 
apart, the saints refuse to have anything to do with the 
outsiders. There can be no negotiation and the word 
‘compromise’ means betrayal.” [Mary Douglas, “Seeing 
Everything in Black and White”, accessed on 24 August 
2011, http://projects.chass.utoronto.ca/semiotics/cyber/
douglas2.pdf, p 2.]
22  It is interesting to note that someone like Jürgen 
Moltmann regards the prefix ‘re-’ as ironic, even 
negative. [Jürgen Moltmann, Geloof in de toekomst 
(Utrecht: Ambo, 1969), 32–33.] According to 
him, movements such as the renaissance and the 
reformation, as well as concepts like revolution, 
revival, renewal and restoration, all re(!)veal a longing 
for a (golden) past, which, in itself, implies a cyclical 
understanding of history. It represents change while 
‘dreaming backwards’. He rather opts to embrace 
the completely new reality(novum) instead of the 
old (re). This prompts the question: Should we not 
rather speak of provolution, etc, and, in this sense, 
also of ‘proframing’? I do not believe we necessarily 
have to choose between ‘re-’ and ‘pro-’:Both form 
part of the art of reframing, as it is understood in this 
address. However, ‘re-’ may and should never denote a 
succumbing to first-order, i.e. superficial, change. 
23 Donald Capps, Reframing.A new method in Pastoral 
Care (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990), 3; cf also 
P.Watzlawick, J.H.Weakland& R.Fisch, 1974.Change. 
Principles of Problem Formation and Problem Solution (New 
York/London: WW Norton, 1974), 1–12.
24 R.Bandler& J. Grinder, 1979. Frogs into Princes.Neuro 
Linguistic Programming,ed J.O. Stevens (Moab, Utah: Real 
People Press, 1979), 160.
25 Capps, Reframing, 10.
26 Capps, Reframing, 12.
27 Watzlawick et al, Change, 31.
28  First-order change could be described metaphorically 
as events taking place within a dream – the structure 
or space within which the dream takes place remains 
the dream itself. Second-order change, on the other 
hand, takes place when the dreamer wakes up to a 
different state of consciousness, a different structure and 
space. It represents a shift in approach so that action 
is now focused on the proposed method of change, 
before addressing the problem itself. [Watzlawick et al, 
Change, 11.] Capps describes it as follows: “Reframing 
challenges the assumption that the solution being 
employed is the solution, or would be the solution if 
only it could be performed better.” [Capps, Reframing, 
18.]
29  Second-order change does not normally take place 
automatically. It is rather “… introduced from the 
outside and therefore is not something familiar or 
something understandable in terms of the vicissitudes 
of first-order change, hence its puzzling, seemingly 
capricious nature”.[Watzlawick et al, Change, 24.] First-
order change appears to be the normal (‘common-
sense’) way of going about things, while second-order 
change often seems weird, unexpected and paradoxical. 
Therefore, second-order change is often preceded by 
states of confusion, shock and uncertainty – by being in 
limbo (liminality).
30 [Capps, Reframing, 12; Watzlawick et al, Change, 95.] 
Bandler and Grinder – the first scholars to link the 
notion of reframing to their thesis of “neuro linguistic 
programming” – offer an extended definition of 
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description of this concept: “Reframing is a specific 
way of contacting the portion or part – for lack of a 
better word – of the person that is causing a certain 
behavior to occur, or that is preventing a certain other 
behavior from occurring. We do this so that we can 
find out what the secondary gain of the behavior is, and 
take care of that as an integral part of the process of 
inducing a change in that area of behavior… Reframing 
is a way of getting to say ‘Hey, how else can I do 
this?’ In a way it’s the ultimate criticism of a human 
being, saying ‘Stop and think about your behavior, 
and think about it in the following way: Do something 
new; what you’re doing doesn’t work! Tell yourself 
a story, and then come up with three other ways of 
telling the story, and suddenly you have differences in 
your behavior.” [Bandler& Grinder, Frogs into Princes, 
138,183.]
31  G.W. Lathrop, Holy Things. A Liturgical Theology 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 33.
32 Jaap Durand, The Many faces of God: Highways and 
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of Jesus as the crucified messiah that the origins of 
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